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Translators of German philosophy into English must often choose whether to 
express concrete or abstract meanings for polysemous German keywords. This 
article discusses “differential translation,” a widely underestimated strategy for 
representing polysemous words in translation. Disavowing both untranslata-
bility and the necessity of terminological equivalence, this strategy integrates 
signs of polysemy into the reading experience by presenting foreign keywords in 
brackets after their differing, context-dependent meanings. The article discusses 
how translators have already responded and how they might respond even more 
constructively to passages where Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Hans 
Blumenberg, respectively, choose words that link abstractions to images: by 
presenting existence as both foundational and ground-like (gründlich), time as 
both fluctuating and fluid (strömend), and common sense as both obvious and 
nearby (naheliegend). Encountering differentially translated texts would chal-
lenge future scholars to evaluate the unity of the concepts behind the words.
Keywords: polysemy, phenomenology, metaphor, untranslatability, Heidegger, 
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Introduction
German and French words that gained prominence through translations of 
Continental philosophy texts now permeate the Anglophone humanistic disci-
plines and thus affect English language discourses around profound matters from 
theology to critical theory. 1 German words often mean exactly what their etymolo-
gies indicate besides having other abstract meanings, more often than their English 
1. Words that have come from translated Continental philosophy and acquired general use 
in humanistic scholarship (after being adopted by thinkers such as Judith Butler and Donna 
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near equivalents do. Context does not always differentiate between concrete or 
abstract meanings for polysemous German words. These words thus become a 
great challenge to translators of German philosophy. For instance, German’s pro-
ductive über- (over) and unter- (under) prefixes contribute to Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
vivid style in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The German verb untergehen bears the et-
ymological sense “to go under” (concrete), but it commonly means “to meet your 
demise” (abstract), reflecting the cross-cultural tendency to figure hardship with 
the “orientational metaphor” of low altitude (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 196). Since 
polysemous German words can express unified concepts where the target language 
differentiates between multiple concepts, I propose translating such words differ-
ently by context throughout the text, and presenting them in parentheses after 
each translation. I call this strategy “differential translation” since it differentiates 
words’ dual (or various) concrete and abstract meanings.
Many philosophers dub words “untranslatable” on the basis of indetermi-
nate meaning alone. 2 When polysemous words’ meanings shift by context within 
texts, the difficulties mount. Yet some argue quite rightly that the proliferation of 
“untranslatable” words need not deter the work of translation; rather, it requires 
responsiveness to the particularity of texts. 3 Differential translation works anal-
ogously to differential functions in calculus, which measure the rate of change 
within physical processes, such as the changing rate at which water dissolves as its 
temperature increases. The source text and the timespan of a physical process are 
the analogous objects; differential translation registers the changes in meaning of 
a word in the source text, just as a differential function measures the changes in 
rate of a physical process. Differential translation thus tests words for meaning var-
iance by sentence context. Translating different occurrences of a word (untergehen) 
in a text differently displays a word’s differentiated meanings (“descend” when 
Zarathustra leaves his mountain hermitage, “meet [your] demise” when unterge-
hen becomes his controversial moral advice). 4 Translating a word differentially 
Haraway) include: “problematic” (Kant, Althusser), “lifeworld” (Husserl, Habermas), and the 
gerunds “Being” and “Becoming” (Heidegger, Deleuze).
2. Le pain for Benjamin, to season for Derrida, cheese for Jakobson, and gavagai for Quine only 
require one ambiguous context each to exemplify translation problems (Benjamin 2000; Derrida 
2001; Jakobson 1971; Quine 1960).
3. (Beals 2014) and (Koller 2004) argue through readings of Paul Celan and J. R. Ladmiral 
respectively that “untranslatables” are no longer impediments to translation when these authors’ 
works are studied at the level of text rather than lexeme.
4. Walter Kaufmann translates untergehen consistently as “to go under” (Nietzsche 1995: 10, 15). 
His choice produces a reader friendly text, but differential translation would even more clearly 
show Nietzsche’s imaginative wordplay.
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attempts to recreate a foreign culture’s experience of meaning. It expands the read-
er’s context much like glosses and annotations, the familiar academic strategies for 
achieving culturally mediating “thick translation” (Appiah 1993: 817). Differential 
translation is an especially promising way to convey linguistic difference because 
it integrates signs of difference into the reading experience.
Robert Adams’ translation of the lexeme virtù in Nicolo Machiavelli’s The 
Prince is one of the clearest published examples of differential translation. Virtù is 
the kind of polyvalent concept that Barbara Cassin might call an “untranslatable.” 
Macchiavelli uses it to designate the polymorphous character trait whose effect is 
the acquisition of political power; the fact that virtù’s presence can only be assessed 
post hoc foils attempts to characterize it beyond its particular manifestations. The 
translator translates it four different ways on the same page: first as “strength” 
when contrasting it with “luck:” “I’d like to illustrate these two ways of becoming 
prince, by strength [virtù] or by luck…” (Machiavelli 1977: 19). Then he selects 
“shrewdness,” a seemingly distinct trait, to describe how Francesco Sforza “used 
the appropriate means with great shrewdness [virtù] to become duke of Milan.” Its 
adjectival form, virtuoso, is translated as “able,” a trait which may or may not be a 
matter of luck. Last, virtù as “effort,” inflects how one reads the other translations: 
the earlier tokens of virtù refer to deliberately applied qualities, as opposed to 
passively reproduced ones. By not settling on one English equivalent for virtù, dif-
ferential translation presents virtù as a polysemous word for a polyvalent concept.
To my knowledge, only one recent study has expressed the advantages of dif-
ferential translation. David Charlston praises nineteenth-century translator, Sir 
James Black Baillie, for using both “mind” and “spirit” when translating Geist in 
G. W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Charlston 2014: 15). Inconsistent trans-
lations of keywords without the source word in brackets notoriously causes other 
critics irritation. Jean Laplanche criticizes James Strachey for translating Sigmund 
Freud’s Nachträglichkeit as context dictated, with “later,” “belatedly,” and “deferred 
action” among other words; in such a translation, a supposedly unified concept 
is “diffracted in different contexts and it gives the illusion that there are several 
meanings” (Laplanche 1993: 42). I will respond further to Laplanche’s criticism 
after arguing that ambiguous concepts deserve such diffraction, that the German 
philosophical language is rich in ambiguous concepts, and that including source 
words in brackets does not make a diffractive translation but a differential one.
Both for reasons of linguistic history and of genre, the language of German 
philosophy works closely with untranslatable etymological figures. German lan-
guage philosophy exhibits a higher degree of polysemy than its English counter-
part for three notable reasons: (1) German words are constructed from Germanic 
roots, and thus their etymologies are transparent to native speakers – unlike 
English, where erudite vocabulary often comes from Greek and Latinate roots, 
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which severs the associative links between concrete (handy, Germanic) and ab-
stract (dexterous, Latinate). As a result, many German words present native speak-
ers with a greater number of easily registered connotations than English ones. 
(2) The total number of words available in English is greater than in German, with 
the result that German words often denote more different concepts than English 
ones. And (3) phenomenology, a philosophical sub-field developed in Germany, 
focuses on notoriously difficult phenomena to define, such as time, subjectivi-
ty, and other general features of experience. Given their difficult task, twentieth 
century German phenomenologists offer various justifications for utilizing the 
suggestiveness of German etymologies to illustrate their abstract concepts. Martin 
Heidegger’s etymological figures are well known, but this article will show why 
etymology also matters when translating work by other phenomenologists whose 
rhetorical styles and theory of languages differ from Heidegger’s. The article fo-
cuses on three philosophers: (1) Heidegger, (2) Edmund Husserl, under whom 
Heidegger studied, and (3) Hans Blumenberg whose teachers (Ludwig Landgrebe 
and Walter Bröcker) had themselves studied under Husserl and Heidegger, respec-
tively. These three philosophers’ texts link abstractions to images: by presenting 
existence as foundational and ground-like (gründlich), time as fluctuating and fluid 
(strömend), and common sense as obvious and nearby (naheliegend).
German philosophers tend to develop concepts with a wider range of meanings 
than English-speaking philosophers do because the German language imbues its 
fewer words with more meanings through transparent etymology. This situation 
contributes to readers’ frustration with English translations of German philoso-
phy. Translators can relieve some frustration by exposing ambiguous words. This 
article reviews extant strategies for capturing implicit imagery when translating 
Heidegger, Husserl, and Blumenberg. For these authors, etymology suggests a logic 
of images alongside the logic of the argument. 5 Figurative associations form a “di-
mension of argumentation,” which translators omit at the cost of the “destruction 
of underlying networks of signification” (Berman 2000: 292–3). Translators of such 
texts have a double task: to present overt claims while also registering keywords’ 
suggestive polysemy.
These three philosophers multiply the suggestive etymologies of Strom, Grund, 
and liegen by exploiting both the productivity of German word compounding 
and polysemous morphology. Husserl selects a compound word to designate 
5. Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive enterprise draws heavily from the latent metaphors in 
Husserl’s work and in Heidegger’s, such as Husserl’s figuration of primary phenomena as inner 
voice, and existence as being there in Heidegger (Derrida 1973; 1991). Derrida claims that these 
images reveal moments where these thinkers covertly insert empirical evidence into claims about 
structures (consciousness or Dasein) that are supposed to function a priori.
120 Spencer Hawkins
the ever changing content of consciousness: the “stream of consciousness” 
(Bewußtseinsstrom). Strom denotes a surging force, and only in this compound 
does it refer to the abstract idea of consciousness’s fluctuating content. 6 With an 
aversion to fluid imagery, Heidegger names the lack of rationale for the fact that 
something exists (rather than nothing) with a topographical image: the “abyss 
of Dasein” (Ab-grund des Daseins). Etymologically, Ab-grund means an absent 
ground, and the hyphen emphasizes Ab-grund as separate from grounds, thus 
without rationale. While Husserl embraces his metaphor, Heidegger deempha-
sizes the concrete abyss image – a giant hole in the ground – since it could give 
Heidegger’s speculation about existence the sound of imprecise metaphor.
Furthermore, Abgrund suggests a mystical force, Strom a natural one, na-
heliegend an everyday phenomenon. Christian theology preserves connotations of 
“abyss” dating back to the mythical Greek Tartarus, the abyssal origin of the world 
and a site of afterlife punishment. Heidegger’s language often suggests archaic or 
religious images of suffering, sacrifice, and apocalyptic revelation (See Stellardi 
2000: 159). While “proximity” is a cross-cultural “orientational metaphor,” too 
ordinary for its discursive history to be traced, German etymology animates the 
concept in the word naheliegend, which means “obvious,” but whose etymology 
means “lying nearby.” Blumenberg does not treat it as a term, but it is his chosen 
word to describe the stars’ distance from earth when that distance figures for dis-
ciplines like astronomy and philosophy, which appear irrelevant to worldly affairs 
(because their relevance is not “obvious”). Blumenberg lets the syntactic context 
dictate whether the word carries its abstract denotative meaning, “obvious,” or 
its concrete spatial etymology, “lying nearby.” In all three cases, English cognates 
of the German words translate the image (ground, stream, and near) whereas 
Latinate words convey the abstraction (reason, flux, and obvious).
When these philosophers orient their work around images, they also suggest 
different theories of mind. Grund: the mind possesses knowledge. Just as people 
claim land, people claim to have figurative “grounds” that give their arguments 
validity. Heidegger, whose academic training is in medieval Scholasticism, treats 
knowledge as predicative: we can have knowledge because objects have knowa-
ble properties. Strom: knowledge happens to the mind. Streams move, and when 
Husserl uses streaming time consciousness as the image for the subject, object, and 
process of knowledge, he makes knowledge into a time bound event that occurs 
independently of the knower. Knowledge occurs to the mind only to evaporate 
unpredictably, just as streams introduce water from elsewhere and then carry it 
6. As Andrea Rehberg reminds me, Strom is the German word for the largest of rivers (and 
electricity). Its adequacy as a metaphor for time derives from its reference to an overwhelming 
force.
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away. Naheliegend: knowledge is a relationship to an object. To know is to give 
an object a place in our sphere of knowledge and thus to bridge the “ontological 
distance,” which obscures objects by holding them out of our reach (Blumenberg 
1950: 18–19). While these three concepts have not been thematized together before, 
they are among the paradigmatic metaphors that structure Continental philoso-
phy. They also get lost in English translation when denotative meaning is expressed 
without conveying their image content.
1. Grund, ground or reasons? (Heidegger)
This section focuses on one translation choice that almost every translator of 
Heidegger approaches differently: expressing the polysemy of Grund. Heidegger’s 
use of Grund is difficult to translate because he draws on suggestive connotations 
of the word while disavowing the use of metaphor and expressing contempt for 
translation. Translators and scholars have discussed Heidegger’s difficult style and 
developed innovative strategies for translating it, some even resembling differ-
ential translation. 7 Before discussing the strategies, it is important to discuss the 
complicating effect of Heidegger’s stance on metaphor and translation. Heidegger 
disavows metaphor because he claims that metaphors imply that the abstract and 
concrete are essentially different, and metaphor is therefore complicit with the 
mistake of metaphysical dualist thinking. This disavowal can leave readers per-
plexed at Heidegger’s heavy reliance on the concrete and abstract meanings of 
his keywords. It is difficult to avoid reading Grund as metaphoric in the contexts 
discussed below, but differential translation leaves it to the reader to evaluate the 
coherence of Heidegger’s claim.
Der Satz von Grund (1955–56), Heidegger’s lecture on the principle of suffi-
cient reason, will be the main focus of this section. In it, Heidegger argues that the 
philosophical use of Grund historically derives from the Greek logos, and he denies 
any value to translating great poems or philosophy texts. Andrew Benjamin’s book 
on translation and philosophy quite correctly diagnoses a disdain for polysemy 
behind Heidegger’s disdain for translation since Heidegger imagines that Greek 
words such as logos and physis first functioned not as unstable signifiers, but as 
7. The series Contributions to Phenomenology recently published a volume on philosophical 
questions surrounding the translation of Heidegger (Schalow 2011). A monograph argues that 
Heidegger must be translated with attention to the word, not the sentence, following the “parat-
actic method” that Heidegger uses to translate Parmenides (Groth 2004). Laurence Venuti claims 
that translating Heidegger benefits philosophers’ “translatorly self-consciousness as well as… 
their own philosophical research” (1998: 119).
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expressions of the Greeks’ openness to the unknown (1989: 25–31). Polysemy re-
sulted from a presumed Babel event (around 600 BC) where these words’ mysti-
cal power was forgotten, and they splintered into unstable meaning (Heidegger 
1991, Vol. 1: 149). The concealment of the origin and the proliferation of new 
meaning were both exacerbated by these words’ later translation into Latin. In 
his Parmenides and Heraclitus lectures held in 1942–3 and in 1944 respectively, 
he carefully considers translations of each word within those authors’ fragments 
while only tentatively arriving at full reconstructions of their sentences.
Despite its consistency with his post-metaphysical critique of metaphor, 
Heidegger’s dismissive view of translation “foreswears one of his own most power-
ful philosophical methods, radical translation from Greek,” in Douglas Robinson’s 
words (Robinson 2001: 100). Robinson challenges Heidegger’s stance against trans-
lation by translating a passage where Heidegger bans the translation of philosophy 
while simulating Heidegger’s own aporetic translation procedure. Robinson trans-
lates it in three different ways: first straightforwardly, then playing up etymolo-
gy at the expense of meaning, and, third, by inserting sarcastic commentary on 
Heidegger’s mysticism. The triple translation functions as commentary; the main 
effect of its plurality is to reenact Heidegger’s aporia around translation choices. 
Robinson is not attempting a standard translation of Heidegger’s language; rather, 
he is communicating Heidegger’s thought (a procedure he calls “spirit-channe-
ling,” which he claims Heidegger also performs). Differential translation might 
not please Heidegger, who disdained “calculative thinking” and its effects on lan-
guage. Unlike the total deferrals of spirit-channeling, differential translation only 
disturbs the unitary surface of the source text at the site of particularly suggestive 
polysemous words. 8
Although Heidegger would certainly not accept my solution, he might acknowl-
edge that untranslatability is primarily a lexical problem – not a grammatical one. 
Heidegger discusses the untranslatability of the lexeme Grund in Der Satz vom 
Grund, the text from which Robinson selects to perform his polemical translation. 
Heidegger’s text, originally a lecture from 1955–56, offers a corrective interpretation 
of the so-called “principle of sufficient reason” (der Satz vom Grund, etymologi-
cally translated, “the setting of the ground”). This principle states that nothing 
is without a reason (or ground). Leibniz understands the principle to mean that 
causal explanations both exist and may be discovered for all physical and psycho-
logical phenomena (ratio fiendi) as well as for metaphysical truth (ratio essendi). 
Heidegger counters that rational explanations fall short of explaining existence. The 
8. What Robinson calls “spirit-channeling” resembles Paul Ricoeur’s “never finished” transla-
tion, as Lisa Foran describes it: “Ricoeur explicitly links justice with the need to mourn the perfect 
translation” (Foran 2015: 40). Both emphasize the authentic experience lost in translation.
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world – anything contained in it – exists, but Heidegger considers this inexplicable 
by causal explanation, which is limited to describing the rational realm. Heidegger 
thinks of the Grund for existence as a quasi-physical ground, not as a cause. As 
Heidegger scholar Nicholas Rand puts it, “Heidegger treats words as repositories of 
unseen or submerged meanings” (1990: 437). And as the translator of “The Principle 
of Ground” explains: “Heidegger wants us to hear this principle ‘in a different key,’ 
and for this we must hear it as the principle of ground” (1974: 207). Inspired by a 
similar insight, the translator Richard Taft uniformly renders Grund as “ground” 
(never “reason”) in translating Heidegger’s 1929 lecture (1997). But only translating 
Grund as “ground” misses a rhetorical dimension of Heidegger’s text. In doing so, 
we miss the moments of shifting meaning that Heidegger effects between the one 
understanding of Grund and the other. Such differentials of meaning across a text 
are precisely what a technique like differential translation exhibits.
In efforts to grapple with Heidegger’s language of “grounding,” two transla-
tors have published translations of Der Satz vom Grunde with different titles: The 
Principle of Ground and The Principle of Reason (Heidegger 1974; Heidegger 1996). 
Der Satz vom Grund confronts the polysemy of Grund at length: besides mean-
ing causal “reasons” – causes behind effects (ratio fiendi) and reasoning behind 
claims (ratio cognescendi) – Grund refers to the ground, the sea floor, and (in the 
“Allemanic-Swabian” dialect) to “heavy, fertile soil” (1996: 96). Importantly for 
his interpretation of “the principle of reason” (to be discussed below), Heidegger 
traces the etymology of the German word Grund to the Latin ratio, which had a 
different polysemy, both the faculty of reason and reason in the sense of causal 
force. Ratio often translates the Greek logos, which Heidegger understands not as 
speech, but as “let[ting] something appear.” (1996: 107). Grund is thus a historical 
derivative of the Greek logos, where the former’s meaning as “grounding” captures 
something kindred to the latter’s meaning as “letting appear.”
With so much focus on etymology in this lecture, it is suitable that Reginald 
Lilly translated the word Grund in this lecture with a technique closely akin to 
differential translation. He translates the full lecture under the title The Principle 
of Reason and varies the translation of Grund between “foundation,” “ground,” 
“grounds,” “reason,” “reasons,” and, when the ambiguity is too essential to trust 
to the reader’s memory of the polysemy evoked across different contexts, the dis-
junctive “ground/reason” is selected: “Being qua being remains ground-less (grun-
dlos). Ground/reason (Grund) strays from being, namely, as a ground/reason that 
would first found being, it stays off and away” (1996: 111; German added). Lilly’s 
disjunctive translation shows the dualism operating within Heidegger’s term, but 
it would disorient the reader if the number of meanings in disjunction exceeded 
two. Lilly also refrains from putting the word in brackets, because we know from 
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reading the translator’s preface that this is the only word he translates differentially 
and that we are dealing with the same word twice when we read: “The principle 
of reason (Grund) as the ground/reason (Grund) of the principle – this confuses 
our ordinary cognition” (1996: 14; German added).
Differential translation could extend to register compound words containing 
Grund. When Heidegger explores the topographical suggestiveness of Grund in 
Being and Time, he produces a paradoxical image where Being is at once Grund 
and Abgrund (abyss): “The meaning of Being can never be contrasted with entities, 
or with Being as the ‘ground’ (Grund) which gives entities support; for a ‘ground’ 
becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it itself is the abyss (Abgrund) of 
meaninglessness” (2008: 193–4). The translators of Being and Time mark this un-
translatable moment with a footnote: “Notice the etymological kinship between 
‘Grund’ (‘ground’) and ‘Abgrund’ (‘abyss’).” Beginning in his earliest lectures, 
Heidegger emphasizes the etymology of Abgrund as an expression of Being’s rela-
tionship to Grund by hyphenating the word as Ab-grund. “Ab” is a prefix, whose 
spatial connotations include distant position and downward sinking movement 
whereas the “a” in the English “abyss” is merely privative (from Middle English a + 
bussos “without depth”). This hyphenation is so difficult to express in English that 
Terrence Malick paraphrases the single word Ab-grund with six English words: “…
freedom is the abyss of Dasein, its groundless or absent ground. (…Freiheit [ist] 
der Ab-grund des Daseins)” (1969: 129; German 130). Malick’s translation comes in 
a format that gives the whole source text, unlike the focused offerings that differ-
ential translation gives: his edition offers facing page source and target texts. This 
lets the reader compare more choices than the reader of differential translation 
could, but does not show the reader where to start.
Philological annotations may not be enough to show readers how ambigu-
ously some concepts function. While disjunctive translation works well in cas-
es where only two alternatives exist, Lilly resorts to something like differential 
translation to show how the meaning of Grund changes in the text. Facing page 
bilingual editions yield much for language students and philologically minded 
scholars, but they do not isolate translation choices. The reader can find Malick’s 
thoughts on Grund and Abgrund in the appendix, but the reader would be served 
better by a translation that pointed out difficult decisions where they are made. 
Consistently translating Grund (and related composita such as Abgrund) with 
image rich translations (like Richard Taft) merely obscures the move between 
concrete and abstract meanings. Differential translation is more difficult to justify 
when translating Husserl since he announces whether his language is figurative 
or not. Yet Husserl too offers occasions for differential translation when he slips 
unannounced meanings into his terminology.
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2. Strom, stream or flux? (Husserl)
Metaphoric language does not particularly plague translators of Husserl. Husserl 
builds his terminology around a central hydrological metaphor: the fluctuating 
content of consciousness enters and leaves in a stream-like procession. Husserl 
evokes the physical properties of streaming water to describe how consciousness 
spans time, just as Heidegger links the unknown reason for the world’s existence 
with the image of solid ground. Etymology opens up associations between these 
philosophers’ terms and the concrete objects they evoke. Husserl not only likened 
so-called “internal time consciousness” to a moving current (Strom), he pursued 
its semantic implications: the present as headwaters, self-reflection as a shore, 
and conscious experience as swimming. 9 In Husserl’s case, the word Strom could 
also be translated as “flow” or “flux,” which would signify a process of frequent, 
unpredictable change, whereas “stream” conveys an image: electricity or liquid 
surging forth while its surroundings remain stationary. 10 Differential translation 
is only occasionally necessary when translating Strom in Husserl’s writings since 
Strom usually functions for Husserl as a concrete image. This section will focus 
on Husserl’s use of Strom, his meta-commentary on the term, and why translating 
Strom passes for unproblematic.
Husserl explains in the 1905 lecture series on internal time consciousness that 
describing consciousness as a “stream” (Strom) is a deliberate catachresis; that is, 
he applies a well-known word to signify an erstwhile inadequately designated con-
cept. Since Husserl’s “stream” metaphor is deliberately chosen as a metaphor, and 
not as a fixed term, accuracy obliges translators to accentuate the aquatic character 
of Strom. In contrast to Heidegger’s historical-etymological ruminations, Husserl 
was committed to describing acts of consciousness in the best defined language 
possible, and thus every metaphor had to be marked as such. Husserl introduces 
catachresis only when no names are adequate in his 1905 lecture:
9. In his lecture series on internal time consciousness, the headwaters, or “original source” 
(Urquelle) of internal time consciousness is the “primal impression” (Urimpression) that “con-
stantly rises up” in the present moment (Quoted in Tymieniecka 2006: 367). In a posthumously 
published note, Husserl describes the lifeworld as “the living stream in which I swim” (Quoted 
in Blumenberg 2010: 38). In Cartesian Meditations, Husserl develops the metaphor of the shore 
or island as a figure for the ego that observes its own stream of consciousness.
10. Dorian Cairns, a student of Husserl’s, lists “flow” after “stream” as an acceptable translation for 
Strom in Husserl’s work (1973: 108). Colin Smith translates Fluß as “temporal flux” in a reference 
to Husserl from Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, but leaves the verb for “streaming 
in” untranslated in the English as it appears in source text: “…(they sich einströmen, as Husserl 
says)…” (Merleau-Ponty 2002:xv).
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It is absolute subjectivity and has the absolute properties of something to be 
denoted metaphorically as ‘flux,’ (eines im Bilde als ‘Fluß’ zu Bezeichnenden) as 
a point of actuality, as a primal source-point, from which springs the ‘now,’ and 
so on. In the lived experience, we have the primal source-point and continuity 
of moments of reverberation (Nachhallmoment). For all this, names are lacking 
(Für all das fehlen uns die Namen). (1981: 286) 11
John Brough’s translation misses the point of Husserl’s image of Fluß in this par-
agraph; Husserl wants us to see consciousness as a river (Fluß), not just a “flux.” 12 
We are to picture a flowing shape, not just a process of fluctuation. Time’s fluid 
nature has no basis in empirical experience, according to Husserl, but time con-
sciousness resists more precise description. The connotations of flowing liquid 
are invited. For instance, the cohesion of water particles in a stream offers an 
implicit, provisional model for the cohesion of intentional moments we experience 
as sequential.
In the quote above, Husserl only provisionally designates inner time conscious-
ness (inneres Zeitbewußtsein) as a river (Fluß) (elsewhere as a current (Strom)), but 
in his later work the image of flowing water becomes crucial for understanding 
Husserl’s concept of self-reflection. The Cartesian Meditations describe reflection 
as the “splitting of the Ego” where “the phenomenological Ego establishes himself 
as ‘disinterested onlooker,’ above the naively interested Ego” (1977: 35). In the first 
meditation, for instance, Husserl would extend the “stream” metaphor to include 
a metaphorical “island,” which would also allow “the possibility of imagining the 
streaming of the stream of consciousness as observable” (116). Self-reflection is 
figured as a view on the stream where the viewing self identifies with the stream. 
In the fifth Cartesian Meditation, where he introduces the concept of “intersub-
jectivity,” the streaming self occupies a fixed position as the I-pole across from 
other non-I-poles, just as rivers have fixed geographic indices relative to the land 
they border. The self remains fixed in its difference from things and others, just as 
a river remains different from the shore and from other rivers.
Yet in the 1905 lecture, the metaphor of streaming time still primarily refers 
to simple change of content. Thus he describes the cluster of past moments that 
accompany every Now: “Constantly flowing (ständig fließend), the impressional 
consciousness passes over into an ever fresh retentional consciousness” (1981: 280). 
11. Derrida notes this concession to indeterminacy in Husserl but finds it unpersuasive (Derrida 
1973: 84 f.9). According to Derrida, the present moment could be understood through its differ-
ence from other moments – rather than through its enmeshment in a subject-object relation. This 
expands on Heidegger’s case that Husserl’s phenomenology has merely replaced the Cartesian 
God with the transcendental ego and thus covertly endorses metaphysical assumptions.
12. James Churchill translates this word the same way (Husserl 1964: 100).
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If there is one case for differential translation in Husserl’s use of Strom, a case for 
translating Husserl’s lexicon of streams and rivers without hydrological words, it 
would be in quotes like the one above where “constantly in flux” might better show 
that here Husserl also constructs non-hydrological images for time consciousness. 
The pages around this passage utilize a variety of images for time consciousness: 
fluid movement yields to solid or intangible descriptions such as the path of a 
 comet, peripheral vision, and the resonance of a musical tone. It is not a clear 
choice, however, since the translator who selects “flux” over “stream” masks the 
problem that Husserl’s use of Strom suggests an object not just a process.
A metaphor cannot be proven; it either persuades or does not. The stream of 
consciousness image assists Husserl in conducting the descriptive method an-
nounced already in Logical Investigations: to narrate internal experience through 
“descriptive and genetic analyses” that reveal the structures preceding the expe-
rience of logical judgment (Husserl 2001: 49). Heidegger avoided these difficulties 
by abandoning Husserl’s image of fluid consciousness and selecting an image that 
resembles the language of logical categorization: consciousness abides in a fixed 
position. Fluidity is incompatible with Heidegger’s notion that human individuals 
and collectives are fixed in their exterior relationship to Being. As Blumenberg 
describes it:
Heidegger’s ‘consciousness’ does not flow, it stands. It also does not stand by 
itself and not bent over itself; it is outside itself, as it finds itself to be pre-given 
in being-always-already with what it is not: the world. The unavoidability of ex-
pressing the time concept in a spatial metaphorics – which is in no way avoided in 
[Husserl’s] metaphorics of the stream – receives a fundamentally static character.
 (Blumenberg 2012: 126; my translation)
While Husserl figures the process of fluctuation with explicitly metaphoric river 
imagery, Heidegger models an “existential spatiality” without qualifying his use 
of positional imagery as metaphorical. Husserl cautiously marks his metaphors 
for experience as catachreses so that translators know to look for concrete English 
equivalents. By contrast, Heidegger’s synthesis of concrete and abstract language 
spurs translators toward strategies such as differential translation. In both cases, 
the translator does best to pay attention to the actual use of imagery, and not to 
be seduced by the author’s claims about what their words do or do not connote. 
As we will see in the next section, such vigilance is especially merited when the 
author uses a polysemous lexeme without thematizing it as a term.
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3. Naheliegend, obvious or lying near? (Blumenberg)
Hans Blumenberg is well known in Germany for developing a “metaphorology,” 
a framework for analyzing the expressive function of recurrent metaphors in ra-
tionalistic discourses (See Haverkamp and Mende 2009). But little research exists 
on his own rhetoric as a writer. The German present participle naheliegend lacks 
an English equivalent. It ordinarily means “obvious,” but Blumenberg sometimes 
evokes its etymological sense: “lying nearby.” He oscillates between meanings un-
announced and does not develop the word naheliegend into a technical term. There 
would be nothing amiss about translating the word differentially by context – 
throughout single texts and between different ones. But differential translation – as 
I have defined it – would mean drawing attention to this foreign word by putting it 
in brackets at each occurrence in the target text, and the reader might not find this 
procedure justified with a non-terminological word in a philosophy text. It is still 
justifiable to use brackets around this word in Blumenberg’s work both because 
it carries varied connotations and because of the importance of such “orientation 
metaphors” across the history of philosophy (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Although 
the word naheliegend is not laden with a history of attention from philosophers, 
it is the only word under discussion in this article to have a closely related im-
age – that of neighboring – listed in Cassin’s Dictionary of Untranslatables. The 
dictionary’s entry on “Neighbor” notes that nearness often fails to constitute the 
category of neighbor, so that spatial proximity cannot determine “who is included 
in the category of the Neighbor” when we hear the Christian injunction to love our 
neighbors (2014: “Neighbor”). Neighboring and nearness are polysemous words: 
laden with moral imperatives and the emotional connotation of “feeling close,” 
respectively.
English speakers could easily misunderstand what Blumenberg is doing with 
the polysemy of naheliegend because proximity is not a familiar English language 
orientational metaphor for “obvious.” Blumenberg is very precise in his selection 
among the various German words for “obvious.” Husserl and Blumenberg often 
use the German word nearest in meaning to  the English “self-evident” (selbstver-
ständlich) to express unquestioned beliefs (See for instance, 1970: 24; 1983: 250). 
Other German words for “obvious” have etymologies suggestive of visual mani-
festation: offensichtlich, literally “open to sight” and ersichtlich, “sightably.” While 
these sometimes translate as “obvious,” they more often mean “apparent,” “evi-
dent,” or “clear.” The polysemy of naheliegend lets Blumenberg play with readers’ 
expectations about what should be obvious. By etymology, something merely 
“apparent” (offensichtlich) might disappear the next moment; something “lying 
nearby” (naheliegend) is inert and will thus remain apparent.
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It would be implausible to claim that naheliegend has as strong a philosophical 
importance for Blumenberg as selbstverständlich does. But naheliegend occurs in 
Blumenberg’s work whenever he discusses one of his favorite figures for philoso-
phy, namely, Plato’s anecdote about the protophilosopher Thales of Miletus:
Why, take the case of Thales, Theodorus. While he was studying the stars and 
looking upwards, he fell into a well, and a neat, witty Thracian servant girl jeered 
at him, they say, because he was so eager to know the things in the sky that he 
could not see what was there before him at his very feet.
 (1977: 174A 121; translation modified)
Blumenberg claims that the anecdote serves “to depict the confrontation between 
theory and the lifeworld” (2015: 11). Naheliegend describes the “obvious” sur-
roundings that Thales ignores when he tumbles into a well. Blumenberg even 
modifies a German translation that he quotes (without citing) elsewhere in order to 
insert the word “tangibly obvious” (Handgreiflich-Naheliegend) into the Theaetetus 
dialogue where the Greek just has “close” (ἐγγὺς), and which his quoted translation 
renders as “tangibly close” (Handgreiflich-Nah) (1987: 18; 1977: 121; 1940: 58). This 
captures Blumenberg’s conflation of the concept of “obvious” with the bodily expe-
rience of “near;” the well’s nearness makes it a synecdoche for Thales’ immediate 
surroundings, and to anyone else the proximate should be obvious.
In the passage from The Legitimacy of the Modern Age where Blumenberg de-
scribes Augustine’s desire to control the discourse of astronomy, Robert Wallace 
translates naheliegend as “obvious:” “Augustine does not want his reader to be led 
to this obvious inference ([a]uf diese naheliegende Konsequenz)” (1983: 309–310; 
1966: 295). Further down on the same page of the same book, Wallace trans-
lates that word as “nearest at hand” following the etymology that the sentence 
so strongly evokes: “The antithesis that pervades the tradition of curiositas since 
the anecdote about Thales between on the one hand what is nearest at hand (das 
Nächstliegende) and essentially urgent and on the other hand the humanely remote 
matters (das menschlich Fernliegende) that conceal the former is reoccupied here 
(bekommt hier eine neue Besetzung)” (1983: 310; 1966: 295). Wallace can ignore the 
primary meaning of the word naheliegend, as “obvious,” since the next clause uti-
lizes the notion of physical proximity to describe the source of obviousness in the 
sense of spiritual importance, of what should not be missed: “Now what is nearest 
at hand is the perception and acknowledgment of the dependence of one’s own 
capacity for truth upon illumination.” The concepts “obvious” and “near” prove 
fungible in describing the history of the Thales anecdote, and, without an English 
word possessing the same polysemy as naheliegend, only differential translation 
fully conveys this double meaning.
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In the previously-quoted passages, it made sense to translate the various inflec-
tions of naheliegend with “obvious” and “nearby,” but as we saw with virtù in the 
introdution, differential translation does not only disambiguate meanings. How 
do we translate naheliegend to preserve the implicit distance metaphor when as-
pects of both meanings are at play? In the following paragraph about the Christian 
attitude toward transcendence, I have differentially translated three nominalized 
occurrences of naheliegend to capture a range of meanings:
If the Latin Patristic still accepts Ovid’s account that humanity was bound to 
an upright gait with lifted head in order to observe the sky, then it becomes a 
metaphor: upon setting out toward the edge of the world, coming from what is 
familiar (Naheliegend), the observer of heaven is on the right path to transcend 
that edge. His plummet would represent the downfall of someone who had not 
wanted to go high enough, who grew weary already at the pagan foreground of the 
cosmic inner surface, and therefore failed to attain transcendence. The problem 
was not that he failed to understand the importance (das ihm Naheliegende) of 
the massiveness of the earth lying in front of his feet, but rather that he failed 
to understand the importance of caring about the base of all cares, his eternal 
salvation. Here the metaphorics of the distant correspond to those of the nearby 
(Nächstliegend), which no longer has any external reality; it has become the in-
ternal horizon of the truth seeker, who must now worry about himself.
 (2015: 30; second two German insertions added)
I translate the first occurrence of naheliegend with “familiar,” rather than “ob-
vious,” since what is familiar is obvious as a result of past experience – which 
includes sensory experience. With “familiar,” I express “obvious” and the image 
of leaving the world behind (since the world is not without surprises but is famil-
iar as a context – compared to whatever “transcends that edge”). Two sentences 
later, naheliegend occurs and means “importance,” in a context where “in front of 
his feet” is already given and “obvious” would not capture the valence here: das 
ihm Naheliegende is what he should have seen, what would have been important 
to pay attention to. Only in the third instance does “nearby” fit since the stars’ 
distance is explicitly contrasted with das Nächstliegende. This keyword ranges in 
meaning, but translating naheliegend as “nearby” within a context of differential 
translation reminds the reader that the concept (whose continuity is indicated by 
the brackets) describes a sensory experience, and sensory experiences never enter 
language without acquiring symbolic functions.
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4. How to translate untranslatables
This article’s proposal of differential translation as a general strategy for translat-
ing polysemous language may strike some readers as parochial. A sophisticated 
theory of translation should allow for a proliferation of strategies to represent 
different translators’ perspectives on different projects rather than dubbing meth-
od A superior to B (See Robinson 1991). Differential translation has at least two 
obvious downsides. The discovery of meaningful etymologies could fall prey to 
“the explorer’s illusion,” which Gérard Genette describes as “the translator’s temp-
tation… to take these clichés [dead metaphors] literally and to render them in the 
translated version by figures that are not in common use” (Genette 1997: 218). 
Even Genette acknowledges that this is often better than eliding key connotations. 
Besides the exoticizing risk, exposing the shifting meanings of words across texts 
and reminding readers that they are reading a translation surely interrupts any 
immersive plaisir du texte and at best replaces it with a joltier jouissance. 13 A text 
can rarely offer both at once, and while it could be argued that Continental phi-
losophy texts are difficult enough without drawing attention to such minutiae as 
untranslatable words, the purpose of differential translation is not only to make 
translation visible for its own sake, but to expose the functioning of polysemy in 
philosophical concept formation.
When authors make explicit claims, their translators have their first duty in 
expressing those claims. Only afterwards can they express the meaningful con-
notations that form what Antoine Berman calls “underlying networks of signifi-
cation” (Berman 2000: 292). But German philosophers often utilize the persuasive 
force of these networks to the extent that we cannot adequately evaluate an au-
thor’s work when a translation severs these networks. Even if translators do wish 
to capture the rhetorical dimensions of texts, they may undervalue the role of a 
particular word’s suggestive etymology or other polysemy when philosophers do 
not thematize a suggestive word as a term worthy of special attention. The problem 
is exacerbated by the fact that it remains unconventional for translators to show 
special attention to language that the author has not marked as terminology.
Theorist of terminology Pamela Faber has observed scientists’ rhetorical habit 
of employing verbs morphologically related to their abstract terms (2015: 18). The 
13. I take Roland Barthes’ distinction between plaisir and jouissance to mark the difference be-
tween entrancing and startling reading experiences (Barthes 1982). Translators of philosophy 
may feel ambivalent about which experience to foster. For instance, David McLintock, the recent 
translator of Freud’s “The Uncanny,” uses in-text annotations even more interruptive than dif-
ferential translation would be for Freud’s untranslatable unheimlich (eeire, uncanny, unhomely). 
And he apologizes for the words “inserted tiresomely often in square brackets” (Freud 2003: lxiii).
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German terms Grund, Strom, and naheliegend evoke verbs with differing lexical 
aspects: the accomplishment “to found” (gründen), the atelic action “to stream” 
(strömen), and the static action “to lie” (liegen). But does this covert dimension of 
meaning work more or less powerfully when our conscious attention to the word is 
diminished because the word is not a term? The translation question is whether to 
mask or to reveal this dimension of analytical language, that is, to translate tech-
nical terms consistently in order to mark them or differentially in order to exhibit 
their polysemy – and furthermore whether only those words marked clearly as 
terms deserve this special attention. Twentieth century phenomenology relies ex-
tensively on “de-lexicalization” – as Paul Ricœur describes the defamiliarization of 
familiar words by evoking suggestive etymology (1977: 292). 14 Translations should 
ideally exhibit explicitly terminological metaphors, like Husserl uses; de-lexical-
ized dead metaphor terms, like Heidegger uses; and de-lexicalized dead metaphor 
non-terms, like Blumenberg uses. The translator may express these images by 
many routes: annotations, paraphrase, foreign words in brackets, and with the 
above techniques accompanied by differential translation of recurrent polysemous 
words. It might make for a distracting reading experience if too many words were 
treated this way, but this at least presents the surest strategy for showing how much 
German philosophy depends on the German language.
Differential translation communicates de-lexicalization handily by convey-
ing a word’s abstract meaning when necessary and the images latent in etymol-
ogy when possible. The effect requires the foreign word in brackets. Freud’s early 
translators translated the word Nachträglichkeit differently (“delay,” “belatedness,” 
“deferred action,” etymologically “carried-after-ness”) without putting the foreign 
word in brackets because they did not read it as a specialized term. Jean Laplanche 
and J.-B. Pontalis lament the inconsistent translations of Nachträglichkeit since in-
consistency makes it “impossible to trace its use” within Freud’s texts and between 
them (1973: 111). Presenting Freud’s lexicon consistently, however, would have the 
drawback of concealing literary allusions and everyday connotations in Freud’s 
language. With this in mind, Adam Phillips, general editor for the New Penguin 
Freud series, commissioned a team of translators whom he wanted to come to “no 
consensus about technical terms, each of the translators writing a preface in which 
they might say something about choices made…” (Phillips 2007). Translators do 
future reception a service if they mark repeated source text word and translate 
14. David Charlston advocates translating Hegel’s doppelsinnig consistently with “ambiguous” so 
that the reader notices that Hegel develops this concept as a term (Charlston 2012: 35). Differential 
translation would reveal more: the etymology of doppelsinnig suggests “double-sensed” whereas 
its ordinary denotation is “ambiguous,” which suggests indeterminate meaning rather than mul-
tiple senses.
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for varied meanings, by translating polysemous words by context while giving the 
original word in brackets. Bracketing foreign words is already widespread among 
translators working from English into other languages, where English terms are 
presumed to be better known than the source language words, but combining the 
foreign word with translations that vary at each occurrence – what I call differen-
tial translation – is not common in translation practice yet. Encountering differ-
entially translated texts would challenge future scholars to evaluate the unity of 
the concept behind the word. Yet with no criterion for finding words that deserve 
this special kind of translation, translators must trust their own reading and decide 
which words bespeak concepts yet to be fully articulated in the target language’s 
theoretical vocabulary.
The recent discourse of philosophical “untranslatables” elicits the question: 
which particular words deserve translators’ special attention? For Barbara Cassin, 
an “untranslatable” arises in the translation process when a word “creates a prob-
lem, to the extent of sometimes generating a neologism, or sometimes imposing 
a new meaning on an old word” (2014: xvii). Cassin registers untranslatables in 
words that accumulate meanings along their textual histories, but any word that 
sets a translator into aporia meets her basic criterion for the designation “untrans-
latable.” This article has shown that untranslatables often lurk within the imagistic 
connotations of abstract vocabulary in languages whose etymologies are more 
transparent than those of the target languages. 15 Since we can neither catalog all 
untranslatables nor assign thorough criteria for their discovery in source texts, 
translators must find a way to mark untranslatables conspicuously so that readers 
can notice and reflect on problematic words. A strategy like differential translation 
would let translators go on translating so that readers can go on philosophizing.
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